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Marriage, Cohabitation and Commitment
*
 
This paper combines partner matching with an intra-household allocation model where 
couples decide if they want to marry or cohabitate. Marriage encourages but does not ensure 
a higher level of spousal commitment, which in turn can generate a larger marital surplus. 
Individuals’ marital preferences and commitment costs vary, and sorting equilibria are based 
on individuals’ marital preferences and propensity to commit. In all equilibria, some married 
couples are able to cooperate and operate efficiently, but some married and all cohabiting 
couples act with limited commitment and non-cooperatively. When spousal marital 
commitment costs are gender symmetric, there is a pure-sorting equilibrium in which all 
partners who prefer to act with commitment in marriage are matched with someone who has 
the same preference. In such an equilibrium, the benefits of marital commitment accrue to 
both partners. When commitment costs are not gender neutral, there can also be mixed-
matching equilibria in which a partner who is willing to act with commitment in marriage is 
matched with someone who is not. In all such equilibria, the benefits of marital commitment 
accrue only to those men or women who are in short supply. Consequently, a shortage of 
men (women) who can maritally commit makes all women (men) worse off and materially 
indifferent between marriage or cohabitation. An excess supply of men who prefer marriage 
not only reduces the marriage incentives of men and raises those of women, but also the 
marital commitment incentives of men. As a corollary, if the gains from marriage fall, not only 
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* I am grateful to Pierre-Andre Chiappori and Yoram Weiss for their critical intellectual input but, of 
course, all the remaining errors are mine alone. 1 Introduction
A fundamental question in family economics is the degree to which partners in a long-
term relationship–be it marriage or cohabitation–can cooperate and act with some
level of commitment. While we do not yet have a consensus on this issue, whether
marriage typically involves fully cooperative spousal behavior or limited to no spousal
cooperation has profound normative as well as positive implications.1
The propensity to cohabitate has secularly risen in most, if not all, industrialized
countries in the last decades, with a commensurate decline in the marriage rates.
Cohabitation used to be rare in most countries until recently, which is why relevant
data remain scant. But Chiappori et al. (in progress, Ch. 1), provide some evidence
from Denmark and the United States. Accordingly, cohabitation is more common
amongst the young and the propensity to cohabitate for all age groups is higher
now than it was twenty years ago. Within each age group, married couples have
more children than cohabiting couples who in turn have more children than singles.
Moreover, the proportion of cohabiting couples declines sharply with age. Hence, we
have some evidence that cohabitation is an imperfect substitute for marriage, with
cohabitation involving a lower level of commitment.
The existing literature does make a distinction between legal marriage and non-
marital cohabitation in so far as the former reﬂects commitment and the latter does
not. Beyond that, however, there isn’t much to distinguish marriage from cohabita-
tion or the extent to which spousal commitment levels are endogenous and they could
vary within the institution of marriage itself. But to the extent that commitment
is not synonymous with legal marriage and individuals could diﬀer in their attitudes
toward cohabitation and marriage, the trends in marriage, cohabitation as well as
spousal commitment ought to coevolve and they should be jointly analyzed. Put
diﬀerently, the fact that marriage as an institution generally reﬂects a higher level of
spousal commitment does not suggest that the behavior of married and cohabiting
couples could be analyzed in isolation from each other.
In fact, if marriage and cohabitation are imperfect substitutes and the choice of
partnership commitment could vary within marriage too, then it is important to iden-
tify the conditions under which some couples choose to marry and act cooperatively,
1For further details on the links between commitment and eﬃciency, see Chiappori et al. (2008),
Browning (2009), Lundberg and Pollak (2003, 2009) and Matouschek and Rasul (2008).
2while others decide to marry with a lower level of commitment or simply cohabitate,
mostly refraining from a commitment to a longer-term relationship. Such a quest
requires a uniﬁed framework according to which marriage and cohabitation as well
as cooperative and non-cooperative spousal behavior can coexist in equilibrium and
individuals choose not only their (desired) marital status but their optimal modes of
behavior. The objective of this paper is to develop one such model.
In what follows, I present a model of marriage versus cohabitation and marital
commitment versus limited commitment in determining intra-household choices and
allocations. In the model, couples match to form partnerships, and individuals vary
according to their preferences for marriage and costs of commitment to cooperate
in marriage. Unlike cohabitation, marriage encourages but does not ensure a higher
level of spousal commitment, which in turn can generate a larger marital surplus.
Individuals’ marital preferences and commitment costs vary, and sorting equilibria
are based on individuals’ marital preferences and propensity to commit.
Married and committed couples act cooperatively in determining their intra-
household allocations. As a result, when two partners with low commitment costs
marry, they abide by eﬃcient household choices and allocations. But when two in-
dividuals with high commitment costs and marriage preference match, they decide
to marry although they may not cooperate, whereas a match of two high-cost, low-
marriage preference individuals results in cohabitation. In contrast, if an individual
with a high commitment cost marries a spouse whose cost is relatively low, the former
can take advantage of his partner’s decision and extract all of the surplus generated
by their marriage.
The essential idea here is that a committed spouse makes a costly–and, perhaps,
marriage-speciﬁc investment–which leaves her vulnerable to opportunistic spousal
behavior. When spousal choices such as labor supply and production specialization
inﬂuence not only household incomes but allocations within it, cooperative behavior
would be harder to sustain because it could be costly for household members to
commit to eﬃcient choices. Indeed, there are empirical ﬁndings which suggest that
spousal specialization and labor force detachment inﬂuence spousal threat points.2
2For example, married men work longer hours in the market and have substantially higher wages
than unmarried men, and married women work less and have lower wages compared to single women.
Together these ﬁndings imply that wives who commit most or all of their time to domestic production
could be worse oﬀ in divorce whereas husbands who work full time could be better oﬀ. See Gronau
3On this basis, I assume married couples with divergent commitment costs as well as
all cohabiting couples resort to a non-cooperative Nash-Cournot game. Due to a lack
of commitment to abide by agreed upon courses of spousal action, such couples make
ineﬃcient choices in the conventional sense. I investigate the rational-expectations
equilibrium that arises under such circumstances.
The main ﬁndings that emerge from the model are as follows: In all equilibria,
some married couples are able to cooperate and operate eﬃciently, but some mar-
ried and all cohabiting couples act with limited commitment and non-cooperatively.
When spousal marital commitment costs are gender symmetric, there is a pure-sorting
equilibrium in which all partners who prefer to act with commitment in marriage are
matched with someone who has the same preference. In such an equilibrium, the
beneﬁts of marital commitment accrue to both partners.
The important implication of this is that when there is a mixed matching equi-
librium with, say, committed husbands in short supply, men’s marital commitment
incentives will be higher because committed women compete more intensely for com-
mitted husbands. Alternatively, an excess supply of men who prefer marriage not only
reduces the marriage incentives of men and raises those of women, but also the mari-
tal commitment incentives of men. In such mixed-matching equilibria, the beneﬁts of
marital commitment accrue only to those men or women who are in short supply and
a shortage of men (women) who can maritally commit makes all women (men) worse
oﬀ and materially indiﬀerent between marriage or cohabitation. Hence, even though
allocations and outcomes in uncommitted partnerships are mostly unresponsive to
market forces, the degree to which the institution of legal marriage manifests spousal
commitment and cooperation is driven by individual attitudes toward cohabitation,
marriage and spousal commitment as those are manifested in market dynamics.
If the gains from marriage fall–for example, due to technological change which
diminishes the returns to scale from cohabitation, a la Greenwood, Seshadri and
Yorukoglu, 2005–then not only will more individuals choose to cohabitate but more
married couples will act non-cooperatively. In this, we shall see that structural
(1986), Daniel (1992), and Korenman and Neumark (1992). For a detailed overview, see Weiss
(1997).
Furthermore, recent time-use statistics reveal that women work signiﬁcantly longer hours at home
than men, even though their hours worked in the labor market have converged in the last three
decades. For details, refer to Aguiar and Hurst (2006).
4changes in partner matching or household production impact marriage and cohabi-
tation patterns as well as the intra-household allocations of cohabiting and married
couples.
2 Related Literature
Despite the rising prevalence of cohabitation at the expense of marriage, cohabitation
has garnered far less attention. In fact, most existing models do not distinguish
between legal marriage and non-marital cohabitation and for all practical purposes
the two forms of household partnership are typically lumped as one. One recent
exception is provided by Gemici and Laufer (2009) which posits and estimates a
dynamic model of household formation and dissolution as well as fertility and labor
supply. This paper, along with the work below, represents an inaugural attempt to
explicitly model non-marital cohabitation as an intermediate stage between marriage
and singlehood. More generally, both papers take stock of the interlinkages between
various partnership modes and the options of marriage versus cohabitation available
to individuals in analyzing the dynamics of marriage and cohabitation against the
backdrop of varying levels of commitment.
The traditional approach to analyze household choices takes the family as the
prime decision-making unit.3 The non-unitary household models provide an alterna-
tive to this approach by treating the individual members of the family as the core
decision-makers. Starting in the early 1990s, empirical evidence in support of the
non-unitary model began to accumulate.4 Consequently, the non-unitary household
models have emerged as the compelling theoretical alternative for analyzing the eco-
nomics of the family.
There are three classes of non-unitary models in the existing literature: First,
we have the ‘collective models’ where household members act with commitment and
cooperation to choose from a host of Pareto eﬃcient choices. The generalized under-
pinning of this model was provided by Becker (1981) and Chiappori (1988, 1992). A
closely related strand involves the ‘cooperative bargaining models’ in which a coop-
erative process–typically, although not exclusively, the Nash bargaining paradigm–
3Samuelson (1956) and Becker (1981).
4See, for example, Browning et al. (1994), Lundberg et al. (1997), Chiappori (1998), Chiappori
et al. (2002), and Udry (1996).
5determines household allocations. The seminal examples in this category include
Manser and Brown (1980), MacElroy and Horney (1981), and Sen (1983). And third,
we have models of non-cooperative or Nash bargaining where household members
choose their actions taking as given those of other family members. Some examples
in this line are Lundberg and Pollak (1993), Chen and Woolley (2001), Maher and
Wells (1998) and Basu (2006).
While the existing literature has traditionally sideswiped the distinction between
legal marriage and non-marital cohabitation, it has been far more cognizant of the
issue of commitment and cooperation in partnerships. Indeed, regardless of whether
t h ec o u p l ei sc o h a b i t i n go rm a r r i e d ,ap e r e n n i a l l yi m p o r t a n ti s s u er e v o l v e sa r o u n dt h e
extent to which household choices are made with some commitment and eﬃciently
or ineﬃciently due to a lack of commitment. When spousal choices involve costly
commitment and, hence, they aﬀect the household balance of power, one can no
longer restrict attention to the eﬃc i e n tf r o n t i e r . S i n c ec o m m i t m e n tt oc o o p e r a t ei s
potentially costly and it introduces a hold-up problem, repeated interactions and
an appeal to the Folk theorem would not help to restore eﬃciency either. In such
cases, the plausible alternative is to model spousal behavior as a non-cooperative
bargaining process that can stray from eﬃcient outcomes. For examples of such
models, see Lundberg and Pollak (1994, 2003), Rasul (2005), and Iyigun and Walsh
(2007a).
Although we lack a theoretical underpinning of marital commitment versus non-
cooperative bargaining, recent empirical work has made attempts to identify the valid
mode of intra-household actions. For example, Del Boca and Flinn (2005) estimate
a structural model and ﬁnd some weak evidence in favor of the collective mode of
behavior among couples in the United States. In contrast, Mazzocco (2007) presents
an empirical test of intra-household commitment and, using PSID data, rejects the
hypothesis that household members can commit to future allocations of resources.
This paper also shares some similarities with a burgeoning strand in the eco-
nomics of the family literature which incorporates some aspect of pre-marital decision-
making (such as educational attainment) and spousal matching into a model of intra-
household decision-making. Recent examples include Peters and Siow (2002), Brown-
ing et al. (2003), Chiappori et al. (forthcoming) and Iyigun and Walsh (2007b).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 3, I present the
6generic model. In Section 4, I discuss a speciﬁc example in which couples can co-
operate by specializing in home production and labor market work. In Section 5, I
conclude.
3 The Basic Model
3.1 Assumptions
The populations of men and women are large and equal in mass.5 Men and women
are completely identical in their preferences and opportunities and they all live for
one period. At the beginning of the period, individuals decide whether they want
to live with a partner or stay single. Those who prefer to live with someone then
enter a matching market in order to ﬁnd a mate. Competition over mates determines
who matches with whom. These assignments, together with the known individual
characteristics described below, guides the individuals’ decisions to marry or cohabi-
tate. Married couples also choose their levels of spousal commitment, which in turn
inﬂuences their material surplus.
3.2 Marital Commitment vs. Cohabitation
Each partner who lives together with someone takes an action, such as deciding
how much to work at home and in the labor market or how much time to allocate
to childrearing. The actions of each partner inﬂuences the surplus a married or
cohabiting couple could generate jointly.
I denote a particular man by i and a particular woman by j. All individuals of
a given gender produce the same material output when they are single, but singles’
output level may diﬀer by gender. I denote the material utility of a single man i by
ζm and that of a single woman j by ζw.
Deﬁnition 1 Ac o u p l e{i, j} takes the actions ai, aj ∈ [0, 1] to produce the joint
material output given by ζij = ζ(ai, aj). The material output ζij = ζ(ai, aj) is twice
diﬀerentiable and concave in ai and aj with {aM
i ,a M
j } =a r gm a xζ(ai, aj).
5I address the impact of the sex ratio in Section 3.6 below.
7The couple’s output ζij = ζ(ai, aj) can be divided between the spouses and the
utility of each partner is linear in the share he\she receives. This reﬂects transferable
utility between the spouses. The material surplus o ft h em a r r i a g ei st h e nd e ﬁned as
zij ≡ ζ(ai,a j) − ζm − ζw. (1)
There are two kinds of partnership and two possible modes of equilibrium house-
hold behavior regarding how ai and aj are chosen. In particular, couples can cohabi-
tate or marry. And conditional on their marital status, the couples take the actions
ai and aj. By deﬁnition, these actions are taken non-cooperatively and without com-
mitment in cohabitation. But, in marriage, they can be taken cooperatively and with
some level of marital commitment.
Let a man i be represented by I(i),w h e r eI(i)=M if i is willing to make a
potentially costly commitment to his marriage and I(i)=N if he is not. And let
woman j be denoted by J(j),w h e r eJ(j)=M if j is willing to marry and commit
and J(j)=N if she is not. Let Uj and Vi respectively denote the material allocations
of woman j and man i respectively.
We can now deﬁne the kinds of household partnership and modes of action as
follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Cohabitation): Man i and woman j can cohabitate which does not











j )] s.t. UN+VN ≤ zNN , (1.a)











i ,a j)] s.t. UN+VN ≤ zNN , (1.b)
where, by deﬁnition, aN
i represents the Nash best response to aN
j and vice versa. The
Nash-Cournot material output ζ(aN
i ,a N
j ) ≡ ζNN is such that, ∀ aN
i 6= aM
i ,a n daN
j 6=
aM
j , ζNN <ζ MM and aN
i =a r gm a xVN(ai,a N
j ) ≡ V N and aN
j =a r gm a xUN(aN
i ,a j)
≡ UN.
8Deﬁnition 3 (Marriage): Man i and woman j can marry. In marriage, they can
choose ai, aj with or without commitment:
1. (Commitment) Committed married couples take the actions aM
i ,a M
j . In doing
so, they recognize that ζij = ζMM ≡ ζ(aM
i ,a M
j ) and Uj = UM, Vi = VM,w h e r e
UM and VM represent the endogenously determined shadow prices of committed
husbands and committed wives (which are determined below).
2. (No Commitment) Uncommitted married couples behave as cohabiting cou-
ples do. Hence, they choose aN
i =a r gm a xVN(ai,a N
j ) ≡ V N and aN
j =a r gm a x
UN(aN
i ,a j) ≡ UN.
We now need to specify the outcome of the partnership of a committed and an
uncommitted individual. In such a mixed match, the committed spouse would be
willing to marry and choose the action that maximizes the material surplus (aM
i or
aM
j ) while the uncommitted spouse would maximize only his own material utility
subject to his spouse’s participation constraint. Let the behavior of uncommitted
partners be deﬁned as “opportunistic” when they are paired up with committed
spouses, with aO
i and aO
j representing the actions commensurate with “opportunistic”
mode of action by man i and woman j, respectively. Letting the material output of
a committed husband i and an opportunistic wife j equal ζMO ≡ ζ(aM
i ,a O
j ) and that
of an opportunistic husband i and a committed wife j be deﬁned as ζOM ≡ ζ(aO
i ,
aM
j ), we introduce the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4 (Opportunistic Marital Behavior): When husband i is not com-



















j )=0 . (1.b)
9In words, when they are married to a committed spouse, uncommitted individu-
als act opportunistically and extract all of their marital surplus. This leads to the
following important observation:
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, no spouse can behave opportunistically. Mixed-couples
resort to a Nash-Cournot game and all spouses in such marriages receive UN and
V N.
Proof. ∀ I(i)=M ∧ J(j)=O, Vi(aM
i ,a O
j )=0<VN and ∀ I(i)=O ∧ J(j)=M,
Ui(aO
i ,a M
j )=0<U N.T h u s ,∀ I(i)=M ∧ J(j)=O, ai = aN
i =a r gm a xVi(ai,a O
j ).
Likewise, ∀ I(i)=O ∧ J(j)=M, aj = aN
j =a r gm a xUj(aO
i ,a j).A sar e s u l t ,∀ I(i)
= M ∧ J(j)=O, zij = zNN, Uj = UN ∧ Vi = V N.A n d ,∀ I(i)=O ∧ J(j)=M,
zij = zNN, Uj = UN ∧ Vi = V N.
Consequently, when a committed partner marries an uncommitted one, they gen-
erate the output ζMN = ζNM = ζNN and the surplus zMN = zNM = zNN.S i n c e
cooperation yields a Pareto eﬃcient outcome for all married couples who can commit
and cooperate, it follows that
zMM + zNN >z NM + zMN =2 zNN . (2)
Hence, marital surplus rises with the commitment level of both partners.
There are two parameters in this model which inﬂuence the desire of men and
women to marry or cohabitate, and if they prefer to marry, whether or not they would
be able to act with commitment. First, commitment to a marriage (and, by extension,
a spouse) is costly. It involves idiosyncratic non-pecuniary costs denoted by μi for
men and μj for women. Once an individual decides to maritally commit and takes
a course of action accordingly, these μ’s become sunk costs and dissolving the union
would not reimburse the cost of spousal commitment. Two common examples such
costly commitment are (i) specialization within the household by market and non-
market time use; and (ii) the decision to have children, which might require diﬀerential
time involvement by gender and spouse. For example, having children might require
one spouse to withdraw from the labor market and a prolonged period of labor force
detachment could hurt his/her future wages (Korenman and Neumark, 1992). The
important aspect of such commitment costs is that they are either non-pecuniary
10in nature, such as the social stigma or approval associated with being a maritally
committed spouse. Or, as the examples above indicate, these costs are pecuniary but
of a speciﬁc nature such that the action taken could erode the reservation utility level
or the outside option of the committed spouse.6
Second, individuals derive non-material gains from marriage which I denote by θi
and θj for man i and woman j.T h e θ’s represent the non-material personal gains
from marriage that are above and beyond the satisfaction of cohabiting with someone.
A n do n ec a nv i e wt h eθ’s as the non-pecuniary cost of marriage for each individual,
especially if legal marriage is viewed as more inhibiting or (emotionally) costlier to
dissolve in case either or both individuals want a separation.7
These idiosyncratic cost and preference parameters are assumed to be independent
of each other and across individuals. I denote the distributions of θ and μ by F(θ) and
G(μ) for men and by ˆ F(θ) and ˆ G(μ) for women, respectively. All four distributions
are symmetric around their means.8
We can now deﬁne the total partnership surplus (including the material and non-
6Note, however, an important distinction that I make here: typically, all choices that involve
marital public goods or spousal specialization inﬂuence the material resources of the household and
such choices might involve personal material costs to each spouse as well. Clearly, all such material
costs are embedded in the couples’ material output discussed above. As such, the non-material cost
of commitment, μ, represents the additional utility costs to the person of marital commitment. The
idea is that, due to innate diﬀerences or family backgrounds, some men and women ﬁnd it more
easy to commit to marital decisions and choices than others–whatever the material cost of such
choices might be (as reﬂected in the couples’ material production).
7Generally, one could also factor in individuals’ preferences for being in a partnership and account
for the idiosyncratic non-material gains one can accrue from having a household partner relative to
being single. In that case, even the equilibrium with an equal sex ratio could involve some individuals
who prefer to remain single as well. The rest of the analysis, however, would remain unaltered.
More to the point, the existence of singles in equilibrium on either side of the market would not
aﬀect intra-household allocations in any kind of partnership mode. This is because, as we shall
see below, the inﬂuence on intra-marital spousal allocations in committed marriages mainly derive
from the competition of those who would be on the margins of marriage without commitment and
cohabitation. For this reason, I have chosen to abstract from this angle.
8By construction, the individual costs and beneﬁts are observable at the time of marriage to both
spouses. If the costs and beneﬁts are not directly observable, then the results discussed below would
still go through unaltered if individuals act on the basis of noisy but unbiased signals. If, instead,
the decision to marry and commit is made on the basis of expected costs and beneﬁts, the main
results would still attain but the derivations would become cumbersome.
11material components) generated by the marriage of i and j as
sij =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
zNN if {i,j} cohabit,
zNN + θi + θj if {i,j} marry without commitment,
zMM + θi + θj − μi − μj if {i,j} marry with commitment.
(3)
It is imperative to clarify the diﬀerence between cohabitation and marriage with-
out commitment, or why making such a distinction is even warranted. Clearly, co-
habitation and marriage without spousal commitment are indistinguishable from each
other in terms of the element of commitment involved–none–and the material part-
nership payoﬀs. Whether or not individuals prefer marriage without commitment
over cohabitation is, thus, purely driven by their perceived net cost (or beneﬁt) of
being in the legal marriage state. As we shall see below shortly, this suggests that
there are essentially two pools of individuals from which the maritally committed
spouses could be drawn, with two margins being important for becoming a mari-
tally committed spouse: Among those who have a relatively high preference for being
legally married, the only important parameter would be the burden of commitment.
And even among those who would otherwise choose cohabitation over legal marriage,
there would be individuals whose commitment costs would be low enough for them
to consider marriage with commitment as a viable alternative.
3.3 The Matching Market
Each individual who is willing to marry or cohabitate has perfect substitutes in the
matching markets. Upon this basis, one can identify the spousal allocations within
committed marriages.9 In eﬀect, the matching process provides us with shadow prices
for men and women, where the price of each individual is determined not only by his
or her preferences and costs, but also by those of other available mates.
9A c c o r d i n gt oD e ﬁnitions 2 and 3, intra-household allocations in cohabitation and marriages
without commitment are determined by a noncooperative Nash-Cournot mechanism. Hence, market
forces in general and the supply of or the demand for partners with diﬀerent propensities have no
bearing on allocations in such relationships.
12T h eS t a b l eA s s i g n m e n tP r o ﬁles: Any stable assignment of men to women must
maximize the aggregate surplus over all possible assignments (Shapley and Shubik,
1972). The dual of this linear programming problem posits the existence of non-
negative shadow prices associated with the constraints of the primal that each person
can be either single or matched with one spouse. Accordingly, the complementarity
slackness conditions require
sij ≤ vi + uj . (4)
Condition (4) yields
vi =m a x {max
j
(sij − uj), 0} and uj =m a x {max
i
(sij − vi), 0}, (5)
which means that the assignment problem can be decentralized. That is, given the
shadow prices uj and vi (which by deﬁnition are the shares of man i and woman j
in the partnership surplus), each agent matches with a spouse that yields the highest
“proﬁt” or remains single. Alternatively, we can view the shadow prices uj and vi as
the reservation utility levels that woman j and man i require to participate in any
partnership of marriage or cohabitation.
With this speciﬁcation, we have a convenient structure in which the interactions
between agents depend on their marital preferences and commitment costs only. In
particular, we can write the endogenously-determined shadow prices of married man
i and woman j in the following forms:




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
VI if I(i)=N & i cohabits,
VI + θi if I(i)=N & i marries,





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
UJ if J(j)=N & j cohabits,
UJ + θi if J(j)=N & j marries,
UJ + θi − μi if J(j)=M,
(6.b)
13and where, given Deﬁnitions 2 and 3, VI and UJ are the shares that the partners
receive from the material surplus of the match (not accounting for the idiosyncratic
preferences θi and θj and the costs of commitment μi and μj). Assuming that at least
one person in each class is matched with a partner, this implies that
VI =m a x
J
[zIJ − UJ] and UJ =m a x
I
[zIJ − VI] .( 7 )
All agents receive the same share of the material surplus zIJ no matter with whom
they are matched. And any man (woman) can be fully characterized by his or her
pair of (θ, μ). Consider a person who would be willing to marry and commit to a
particular spouse: No such mate could ask for a higher share than his “going rate”
because he could be replaced by an equivalent alternative.
Stability Conditions: Although, in equilibrium, there are equal numbers of men
and women who are matched with a mate (either in marriage or cohabitation), it
is possible that the equilibrium numbers of men and women who prefer marriage
over cohabitation or those who can marry with commitment would diﬀer. Under
the assumption that all equilibria sustain cohabitation as well as marriages with
commitment, we have
UM + VM = zMM, (8)
UN + VN = zNN .( 9 )
The marital shares of committed wives, UM,a n dh u s b a n d s ,VM,a r ey e tt ob e
determined. But those of uncommitted married couples or cohabiting couples are
pinned down by Deﬁnition 2, according to which we have the Nash-Cournot outcomes
of UN = UN and VN = V N.
On this basis, we can classify the possible matching patterns as follows: Under
pure assortative mating, the number of men who want to marry and commit equals
women who’d like to do the same. And the number of men who’d like to cohabit
equals those of women who prefer the same. In this case, only equations (8) and (9)
hold.
Next, consider these additional restrictions:
UN + VM ≥ zMN,( 1 0 )
14UM + VN ≥ zNM .( 1 1 )
If, among the married, there are more men who are willing to commit to their
marriages than women, some committed men will marry uncommitted women and
condition (10) will hold with a strict equality. But if there are more committed women
than men among the married, then (11) will apply with a strict equality.
When, in addition to equations (8) and (9), either (10) or (11) holds as a strictly
equality as well, then there exists a mixed sorting equilibrium. In a mixed assortative
equilibrium, there are either more men than women who would like to marry with
commitment or the other way around, but not both. It is impossible that both
conditions will hold as equalities because, together with (8) and (9), this would imply
zMM + zNN = zNM + zMN =2 zNN ⇒ zMM = zNN (12)
which violates assumption (2) that the commitment levels of the spouses are comple-
ments, i.e., zMM >z NN. Thus, either committed men marry uncommitted women or
committed women marry uncommitted men but not both.
Moreover, according to Lemma 5, we have zMN = zNN, UN = UN andVM = V N
in equation (10) and zNM = zNN, UM = UN andVN = V N in equation (11). Thus,
when types mix and there are more committed men than committed women among
the married, there are some marriages between uncommitted women and committed
men in equilibrium. In those marriages, couples resort to a Nash-Cournot game so
that Lemma 5 holds and equations (8), (9) and (10) evaluated as a strict equality
generate
UM − UN = zMM − zNN,a n d VM − VN =0. (13)
In words, when uncommitted women marry committed men, then the former
can take advantage of the latter to extract all of the material surplus. As a result,
some men who would otherwise be willing to commit to their marriages would be
forced to resort to the Nash-Cournot non-cooperative behavior in their marriages to
uncommitted women. Since some committed men are still lucky enough to marry
committed women, men compete for committed women up to the point where VM =
VN = V N. This in turn generates the maximum marital return for committed women
which equals UM = zMM− zNN.
If there are more committed women then men among the married, then there are
some marriages between uncommitted men and committed women in equilibrium. In
15those marriages, UM = UN = UN. Together with conditions (8), (9) and (11) holding
as a strict equality, this yields
VM − VN = zMM − zNN,a n d UM − UN =0. (14)
Thus, when there are more committed women than men in the marriage market,
committed men extract all of their marital surplus.
The main point here is that the diﬀerences UM − UN and VM − VN represent
the return to marital commitment for women and men, respectively.10 Consider the
case of women, for instance: The quantity zMM − zNN,w h i c hr e ﬂects the return
a committed woman earns in the marriage market when such women are in short
supply, deﬁnes the upper bound on the return to commitment in marriage, whereas
her return which vanishes when her type is on the long side of the market deﬁnes
the lower bound. The essential observation is that women receive their upper bound
in a mixed equilibrium with more men willing to commit to their marriages than
women who are willing to do so. But committed women who prefer marriage get no
marital surplus if the mixed equilibrium involves more women willing to commit to
their marriages than men.
Proposition 6 (a) In the pure-sorting, fully symmetric equilibrium, UM = VM =
zMM/2 and UN = VN = zNN/2 with UM = VM >U N = VN; (b) In a mixed-marriage
equilibrium with women who prefer committed marriages are short supply, VM = VN
= V N, UN = UN and UM = zMM − V N with UM >V M; (c) In the mixed-marriage
market equilibrium with committed men in short supply, UM = UN = UN, VN = V N
and VM = zMM − UN with VM >U M.
Proof. (a) When the model is completely symmetric, UN = V N,a n d∀θ, F(θ)=
ˆ F(θ), ∀μ, G(μ)= ˆ G(μ). Then, only (8) and (9) hold as equalities and (5) yields equal
shares for all spouses; (b) Follows directly from (8), (9), and (11) holding as a strict
equality; (c) Follows directly from (8), (9), and (10) holding as a strict equality.
An important issue is whether some of the “gross material shares” deﬁned above,
UJ and VI, can be non-positive in equilibrium. In particular, if couples can exchange
10Since the material allocations VI and UJ split the output of man i and woman j,t h e s em a r i t a l
commitment returns are in part based on with whom man i and woman j are matched.
16and transfer “signs of endearment”, then the material shares can be negative in
equilibrium when the non-material utility from marriage is relatively high. But note
that the Nash-Cournot outcome rules out non-negative material spousal allocations.
That is, in all equilibria, UN = UN > 0 and VN = V N > 0. In addition, I prove in
Appendix section 6.1 that UM > UN and VM > VN. Hence, all material equilibrium
a l l o c a t i o n si nt h i sm o d e la r es t r i c t l yp o s i t i v e .
On this basis, everyone prefers living in a marriage or cohabitation partnership
over staying single.11 And as long as the sex ratio equals unity, all men and women
would enter the matching market to ﬁnd a partner with whom they can either co-
habitate or marry with or without commitment.
3.4 Optimal Partnership Modes
I assume rational expectations so that, in equilibrium, individuals know VI and UJ
which, together with the costs of commitment and the non-economic gains of mar-
riage, are suﬃcient statistics for the individuals decision to commit to the ex-ante
spousal allocations or try to renege on them once they marry. Given these shares,
the knowledge of their own idiosyncratic preferences for marriage, θ, and costs of
commitment, μ, agents know for sure whether they will marry, and if they do marry,
whether they will credibly commit to the ex-ante expected spousal allocations, VM
and UM, dictated by the marriage market.
In particular, man i prefers marriage over cohabitation if θi > 0, and he chooses
marriage with commitment over everything else if
ζm + VM + θi − μi >ζ m +m a x ( VN,V N + θi). (15)
Similarly, woman j prefers marriage over cohabitation if θj > 0, and she chooses
marriage with commitment over everything else if
ζw + UM + θj − μj >ζ w +m a x ( UN,U N + θj). (16)
The LHS of the inequalities in (15) and (16) represent the total utility individuals
i and j get when they are committed in marriage and the RHS of the two equations
11See footnote 7.
17represent their utility when they are not, which holds when i or j are involved in
either a marriage without commitment or a cohabitation.
Proposition 7 (1.a) Men for whom θ ≤ 0 and (VM − VN)+θ ≤ μ only cohabitate;
(1.b) Men for whom θ>0 and μ > VM −VN marry without commitment; (1.c) Men
for whom θ>0 and μ<V M − VN as well as men for whom θ ≤ 0 and (VM −
VN)+θ>μmarry with commitment. (2.a) Women for whom θ ≤ 0 and θ ≤
μ − (UM − UN) only cohabitate; (2.b) Women for whom θ>0 and μ > UM − UN
marry without commitment; (2.c) Women for whom θ>0 and μ<U M −UN marry
with commitment.
Proof. The material returns of a noncommittal marriage and cohabitation are iden-
tical; they are either UN or V N. Hence, the non-material gain of marriage, θ,s o l e l y
determines if i or j prefers marriage without commitment over cohabitation. For
θ>0, being married provides an extra non-material gain and marriage dominates
cohabitation. Appendix 6.1 shows all material shares are non-negative and VN ≤ VM
and UN ≤ UM.I f θ>0 and μ > (VM − VN), the RHS of (15) strictly exceeds its
LHS and man i prefers marriage over cohabitation and marriage without commit-
ment to marriage with it. In contrast, if θ>0 and μ<(VM − VN) or if θ ≤ 0 and
(VM −VN)+θ>μ ,t h e nt h eL H So f( 1 5 )s t r i c t l ye x c e e d si t sR H Sa n dm a ni prefers
marriage over cohabitation and marriage with commitment to marriage without it.
Same arguments analogously hold for women.
Figure 1 describes the choices made by diﬀerent men, taking as given those made
by women. The upward-sloping bold line represents μ = θ +( VM − VN), which
delineates the region of commitment in marriage from cohabitation. All combinations
of θ and μ to the right of the upward-sloping line represent men who prefer to marry
with commitment and all those to the left of the upward-sloping line apply to men who
choose to enter a noncommittal relationship. In quadrants II and III, cohabitation is
preferable over marriage without commitment and in quadrants I and IV the opposite
holds. Consequently, all combinations of θ and μ in the II, III quadrants and above
and to the left of the μ = θ+(VM −VN) locus generate cohabitation; all combinations
of θ and μ in the I, IV quadrants and above and to the left of the μ = θ+(VM −VN)
locus generate marriage without commitment. For the remainder of the analysis,
18I assume that the variability in θ and μ are large enough to ensure that all three
regions are always non-empty in equilibrium.
Figure 1 reveals the fundamental issues involved in making the choice among the
three modes of partnership. As I alluded to before, there are two diﬀerent pools of
men from which the maritally committed husbands could be drawn: Among those
who have a relatively high preference for being legally married–those with high θ’s–
the only important parameter is the burden of marital commitment: For these men,
the choice of legal marriage over cohabitation is not in doubt. And a low enough
μ is the only thing that matters for these men to decide whether they want to be a
committed husband or a non-committed one (essentially shifting them from quadrant
I to IV). Among those with a high cost of or low preference for marriage, however,
both θ and μ come into play. Provided that the preference for cohabitation is not too
high, a suﬃciently low commitment cost would be enough to entice these individuals
to consider marriage with commitment as a viable alternative to cohabitation (moving
them from quadrant III to IV).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Given equations (15) and (16) and the distributions of θ and μ, the proportion of






G(VM − VN + θ)f(θ)dθ , (17)






G(VM − VN + θ)f(θ)dθ . (18)
The ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 1 8 )i n c l u d e sa l lm e nw h om a r r ya n dc a n n o tc o m m i t
as well as some of those who marry and commit, i.e., men for whom θ>0 and μ >
VM − VN as well as those for whom θ>0 and μ<V M − VN. The second term in
that equation covers those who get married with commitment because they possess
θ ≤ 0 and (VM − VN)+θ>μ .
19Obviously, the higher is the gross return to commitment in marriage, VM,t h e
higher is the proportion of men who marry and commit. And the higher is the
gross return to cohabitation, VN, the higher is the proportion of men who cohabit or
marry without commitment. It is also the case that more men who seek a committed
relationship would raise the numbers of men who want to marry as well as commit.
3.5 Equilibrium
If the equilibrium involves pure sorting on the basis of marriage, cohabitation and
commitment, then the numbers of men and women who marry and credibly commit












ˆ G(UM−UN+θ) ˆ f(θ)dθ.
(19)
Since, by Proposition 6 we have VN = UN = zNN/2, equations (8) and (19) yield a
system of two equations in two unknowns. That is, (8) and (19) yield unique solutions
for VM and UM. If a feasible solution exists, then there will be equal numbers of men
and women in the marriage markets who can commit. As a result, we will have a pure
sorting equilibrium in which some married couples are in committed relationships
and all cohabiting couples, by construction, aren’t. And while cohabiting couples
play a Nash-Cournot game in order to determine their household allocations, married
couples make household decisions in a fully cooperative manner.
If there is some mixing of types, equation (19) is replaced by an inequality and
the shares UM and VM are determined by the boundary conditions on the returns
to marital commitment for either men or women, whichever is applicable. If there
are more committed men than women among those who wish to marry, then (19)












ˆ G(zMM − zNN + θ) ˆ f(θ)dθ. (19.a)
As a result, we’ll have a mixed equilibrium in which some men who wish to commit
marry women who prefer not to, with all such couples resorting to a Nash-Cournot
20mechanism.
Conversely, if there are more committed women than men among the married,












ˆ G(θ) ˆ f(θ)dθ. (19.b)
Now we’ll have a mixed equilibrium in which some women who wish to commit
marry men who prefer not to, with all such couples resorting to a Nash-Cournot
game.
By adding the numbers of men and women who want to marry without commit-
ment to both sides of (19), we can establish when the aggregate demand for marriage
equals aggregate supply on both sides of the market:
0 Z
−∞
G(VM − VN + θ)f(θ)dθ . =
0 Z
−∞
ˆ G(UM − UN + θ) ˆ f(θ)dθ . (20)
As with equation (19), (20) need not hold in equilibrium. In fact, all four com-
binations are possible, with both (19) and (20) holding as strict equalities, neither
(19) nor (20) being satisﬁed, and only (19) or (20) holding in equilibrium. Clearly,
both (19) and (20) need to hold in a pure sorting equilibrium but (19) won’t hold
in a mixed assortative equilibrium, in which case there is excess demand for marital
commitment on either side of the matching market, and (20) won’t be satisﬁed in
an equilibrium where there is excess demand for marriage either among the men or
women.
To elaborate a little further, the Nash-Cournot payoﬀs, UN and V N, are invariant
to changes in the matching market conditions. Thus, whether or not (19) or (20)
holds as a strict equality depends on whether the market adjustments in UM and VM
suﬃce the clear the excess demand for marriage and marital commitment. Of course,
that is precisely the case when the model is completely symmetric so that, UN =
V N,a n d∀θ, F(θ)= ˆ F(θ), ∀μ, G(μ)= ˆ G(μ), which together yield a strictly interior
solution such that VM ∈ [V N,z MM] and UM ∈ [UN,z MM]. For heuristic purposes and
without loss of generality, I shall assume hereafter that in a purely symmetric and
gender neutral case, VM = UM = zMM/2.
21I depict all possible equilibria in Figures 2 through 4. In all of the ﬁgures, I
depict the equilibrium conditions given by (19) and (20) in terms of VN and VM after
eliminating UN and UM using (8) and (9). The upward-sloping lines deﬁne equations
(19) and (20); they represent the combinations of VM and VN that maintain equality
in the numbers of men and women who wish to marry and in the numbers of men
and women who marry and commit to cooperate. There is no reason for these loci
to overlap as they are drawn, although in a model of complete symmetry they will
overlap with the two market clearing loci collapsing onto each other. These lines
slope upward with a 45 degree angle because a one unit increase in the return to
cohabitation or marriage without commitment, VN, would necessitate an equal rise
in the return to marriage with commitment, VM, in order to restore the equilibrium
between the numbers of men and women who prefer marriage generally and marriage
with commitment.
The vertical line marks the Nash-Cournot payoﬀ to men in cohabitation or non-
committal marriage, which equals zNN/2. Due to the fact that this payoﬀ does not
respond to changes in the matching market conditions, all possible equilibria will
involve this level of VN = V N = zNN/2. The lower horizontal line represents the
case deﬁned by equation (10) according to which the excess supply of men who prefer
marriage with commitment drive their return to commitment in marriage to its lower
bound of VM = V N = zNN/2. The upper horizontal line, in contrast, deﬁnes the
opposite case deﬁned by equation (11), whereby the shortage of men who prefer
m a r r i a g ew i t hc o m m i t m e n td r i v et h e i rr e t u r ni nac o m m i t t e dm a r r i a g et oi t su p p e r
bound of VM = zMM − zNN/2.
As long as the model is completely symmetric, that is UN = V N and, ∀θ, F(θ)=
ˆ F(θ), ∀μ, G(μ)= ˆ G(μ), the equilibrium is characterized by equal sharing: VM =
UM = zMM/2 and UN = UN = VN = V N = zNN/2. With these shares, men and
women have identical commitment incentives. Hence, the number of men who can
credibly commit to marriage equals the number of women who can do so. Such a
solution is described by point e in Figure 2, where the line satisfying (19) and (20)
intersects the vertical line for VN = V N = zNN/2 strictly within the upper and lower
bounds of the VM payoﬀ. In this case, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Maritally committed men and women share their marital surplus equally, so that UM
= VM = zMM / 2. Uncommitted married couples as well as cohabiting ones play the
22Nash-Cournot game in which, due to perfect symmetry, each spouse chooses the same
course of action and we get UN = UN = VN = V N = zNN / 2.
Even when we have a pure-sorting equilibrium, there may be a shortage of men or
women who prefer to maritally commit when VM = UM = zMM/2,b e c a u s eUN and
V N do not adjust for (19) to hold. In that case, VM and UM will adjust away from
zMM/2 in order to clear the market for maritally committed men and women. In
Figure 3, I depict a pure-sorting equilibrium in which, at point e, there is a shortage
of men who are willing to maritally commit. Thus, the upward sloping line that
represents (19) and (20) will shift up so that VM will adjust upward until (19) starts
to hold once again. The new equilibrium point e0 lies above e and on the unique
interior value of VM.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here.]
With further changes in the distributions of θ and μ, the two lines representing (19)
and (20) will shift up or down. For moderate levels of asymmetry, the intersection of
the upward-sloping line representing (19) and (20) continues to intersect the vertical
VN = V N = zNN/2 locus on the interior of the value of VM. In all such scenarios,
the equilibrium still involves pure sorting on the basis of marital commitment. But
with greater asymmetry in the model, the equilibrium will become mixed, because
(19) will no longer hold in the range [zNN/2, zMM − zNN/2]. That is, when either
F(θ) stochastically dominates ˆ F(θ) and ˆ G(μ) dominates G(μ) or ˆ F(θ) stochastically
dominates F(θ) and G(μ) dominates ˆ G(μ), there may be a mixed equilibrium where
either condition (19.a) or (19.b) will hold. Such a case is illustrated by the point e00 in
Figure 4. In this equilibrium, maritally committed men obtain the upper bound on
their return to marital commitment, VM = zMM − zNN/2 and uncommitted married
men or cohabiting ones get VN = zNN/2. The equilibrium point e00 is given by these
combinations of unique VM and VN. In this equilibrium, there is a shortage of men
who can maritally commit and some mixed marriages in which some women prefer
committed marriages in non-committal marriages and others who prefer marriage
ended up in cohabitation.
[Figures 3 and 4 about here.]
23Proposition 8 (1) A pure-sorting equilibrium with equal numbers of maritally com-
mitted men and women requires complete symmetry so that UN = V N and ∀ θ„
F(θ)= ˆ F(θ) ∧∀μ, G(μ)= ˆ G(μ); it is fully characterized by (8), (9), (19) and (20);
and it generates VM = UM = zMM/2 and VN = UN = zNN/2;
(2) A mixed equilibrium with a surplus of maritally-committed men requires F(θ)
to stochastically dominate ˆ F(θ) and/or ˆ G(μ) to dominate G(μ) such that (19.a) holds
with VM = V N and UM = zMM − V N; this equilibrium is fully characterized by (8),
(9), (10) and (19.a);
(3) A mixed equilibrium with a shortage of maritally-committed men requires ˆ F(θ)
to stochastically dominate F(θ) and/or G(μ) to dominate ˆ G(μ) such that (19.b) holds
with UM = UN and VM = zMM − UN; it is fully characterized by (8), (9), (11) and
(19.b).
Proof. See Appendix Section 6.2.
In sum, when there is an excess supply of maritally-committed women in the
matching market, the return to marital commitment for all men rises. This cre-
ates higher incentives for men to maritally commit to ex-ante marital allocations
determined in the matching stage despite the fact that the distributions for marriage
preference and costs of commitment yield higher costs and lower marriage preference
among the men. Also, some men or women who would like to marry but not com-
mit in marriage may have to settle to cohabit with someone, because they would be
b u m p e dd o w nb yt h o s ew o m e nw h op r e f e rt om a r i t a l l yc o m m i tw h oc a n n o td os od u e
to a lack of like minded men. As a result, regardless of whether the equilibrium is
mixed or pure, there can be an excess supply of men or women who would like to
marry in the aggregate.
3.6 Impact of an Unequal Sex Ratio
Although I assumed thus far that there are equal numbers of men and women in the
population, one can easily extend the analysis to examine the impact of an uneven
sex ratio. Let r T 1 represent the ratio of men to women in the population. Then,






















G(VM − VN + θ)f(θ)dθ . =
0 Z
−∞
ˆ G(UM − UN + θ) ˆ f(θ)dθ . (200)
Note that, even if UN = V N and, ∀ θ, F(θ)= ˆ F(θ), ∀ μ, G(μ)= ˆ G(μ),t h e
equilibrium with an uneven sex ratio may not be characterized by equal sharing. For
example, if r>1 and there are more men than women in the population, then both
(190)a n d( 2 0 0)i m p l yt h a tVM will need to decline and UM will need to rise to ensure
that there are equal numbers of men and women who can maritally commit and equal
numbers of men and women who prefer marriage in both its forms. As a result, the
return for marital commitment of the sex in excess supply will fall and that of the
sex in short supply will rise, regardless of whether the matching market equilibrium
is strict or mixed.
For r closer to unity, equation (190) may still continue to hold and a pure sorting
equilibrium with equal numbers of men and women who want to marry and commit
emerging. However, with more uneven sex ratios, equation (190)m a yn o th o l de v e n
if UN = V N and, ∀ θ, F(θ)= ˆ F(θ), ∀ μ, G(μ)= ˆ G(μ). Then, there will be a
mixed equilibrium in which some men who want to marry with commitment match
with women who don’t. Whether there will be equal numbers of men and women
in total in the marriage market will be independent of market clearing among the
committed spouses and (200) may fail to hold even in a pure-sorting equilibrium.
However, ceteris paribus, increases (decreases) in r would tend to create an excess
supply of both committed and uncommitted men (women) in the matching market.
Consequently, increases in the sex ratio r w o u l dm a k ei tm o r el i k e l yt h a tt h eR H So f
both equations (190)a n d( 2 0 0) exceed the LHS.
25In Figure 5, I depict the impact of a rise in the sex ratio. The ﬁgure is drawn under
the assumption that the market is completely symmetric initially; UM = VM = zMM/2,
UN = V N and, ∀ θ, F(θ)= ˆ F(θ), ∀ μ, G(μ)= ˆ G(μ). Thus, when the sex ratio r
equals one, we have the pure-sorting equilibrium with matching market clearing in the
aggregate depicted in Figure 2; that is, there are equal numbers of men and women
who wish to marry, among whom there are also equal numbers of men and women
willing to commit to the ex-ante marriage prices. When the sex ratio r rises above one,
then (190) implies that VM will need to drop and UM will need to rise to compensate
women who wish to marry with commitment for the increase in the number of men
who are willing to commit to cooperative behavior. As a result, the upward-sloping
line which represents market clearing among the committed individuals will need to
shift lower. However, given that VN and UN are determined by non-cooperative Nash-
Cournot behavior, they will not adjust with changes in r. For moderate changes in
r, the equilibrium will still yield pure sorting so that (190) still attains. As shown in
Figure 5, there will be equal numbers of committed men and women in the marriage
market, but due to higher r, the former will get a smaller share of the marital surplus.
In aggregate, there will be a higher number of men who would like to marry but cannot
commit than the number of women who would like to do the same.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Lemma 9 With an uneven sex ratio, r 6=1 , a mixed equilibrium can be attained even
if UN = V N and ∀ θ, μ, F(θ)= ˆ F(θ), G(μ)= ˆ G(μ).
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 8 and equations (190)a n d( 2 0 0).
4A n E x a m p l e
Consider the following simple example to trace the model’s main implications: As-
sume that, irrespective of the diﬀerences in labor market wages or household roles,
26men and women have the same preferences given by
u = v =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
cq if individual i or j is single or cohabiting,
cq + θ if individual i or j is married but not committed,
cq + θ − μ if individual i or j is married and committed,
(21)
where c is a private good, q is a public good that can be shared if two people marry
but is private if they remain single.
The household public good is produced according to a production function
q = t ,( 2 2 )
where t represents time spent in home production. This speciﬁcation reﬂects trans-
ferable utility between spouses, and the fact that the public good q c a nb es h a r e di n
a partnership is what generates a surplus in marriage or cohabitation.
A l li n d i v i d u a l sa r ee n d o w e dw i t ho n eu n i to ft i m e .T h ew a g er a t ef o ra l lm e ni s
identical and equal to wm and that for all women is identical and equal to ww with
wm >w w.
4.1 Marriage with Spousal Commitment
If two mates who wish to marry & commit match with each other in a pure-sorting
equilibrium,t h e ym a x i m i z e
max
q,ci+cj
uj + vi = q(ci + cj)+θi + θj − μi − μj (23)
subject to (22) and their budget constraint
ci + cj ≤ w
m(1 − ti)+w
w(1 − tj) . (24)
The eﬃcient household division of labor then involves the husband specializing in
market work (ti =0 ) and the wife undertaking home production (tj =1 )s ot h a tt h e
maximized material output is
(ci + cj)q = w
m ≡ ζMM .( 2 5 )




subject to qi = ti and
ci ≤ w
m(1 − ti). (27)
His optimal behavior generates a utility level of ζm = wm/4. A single woman j
solves an analogous problem and obtains ζw = ww/4. Therefore, the total marital
surplus generated by a cooperative marriage mode is
sij ≡ zMM + θi + θj − μi − μj =
3wm − ww
4
+ θi + θj − μi − μj , (28)
D u et ot h ef a c tt h a tt h ee q u i l i b r i u mi n v o l v e sp u r es o r t i n g ,w eg e tUM = VM =
zMM/2=( 3 wm − ww) / 8.
4.2 The Nash-Cournot Outcome
Next consider a couple who prefer to cohabitate or marry without commitment in
a pure-sorting equilibrium. Each partner or spouse in such a match recognizes that
his or her partner is not willing to abide by the ex-ante agreement regarding spousal
roles and allocations. Instead, each partner maximizes his or her own utility given by
(21) subject to (22), (27) and taking as given his/her spouses’ choices. That is, such






ciq if {i,j} cohabit,
ciq + θi if {i,j} marry without commitment,
(29)
subject to equations (22), (27), and
q = ti + ¯ tj. (30)
Woman j solves an analogous problem and the optimal time allocation of the
couple (i, j) yields ti = tj =1 /3. Consequently, UN = UN =7 ww/36,ζ m + UN =
4ww/9,V N = V N =7 wm/36, and ζw + VN =4 wm/9.
The maximized material output of the couple is








+ θi + θj ≡ zNN + θi + θj . (32)
4.3 Opportunistic Marital Behavior
In mixed-sorting equilibria, either committed men match with uncommitted women
or uncommitted men match with committed women. Consider ﬁrst the combination
of a committed woman j a n da nu n c o m m i t t e dm a ni, and the scenario in which j
abides by her commitment. Since wm >w w, woman j would supply all of the home
production time (tj =1 ) but man i, given that he is not willing to commit, would
maximize his private consumption taking as given his wife’s full-time commitment.
That is, man i would solve
Max
ti,ci
ciq + θi (33)
subject to
ci + cj =( 1 − ti)w
m ,( 3 4 )





∧ UM =0 ⇒ cj =
ww
4(ti +1 )
.( 3 6 )
As a result, we get ti =0 ,c j = ww/4 and ci = wm − ww/4,w h i c hy i e l dVN =
zNM, and ζm + VN = ζm + zNM, with the total partnership surplus generated by the




+ θi + θj − μj ≡ zNM + θi + θj − μj . (37)
Similarly, when a committed man i a n da nu n c o m m i t t e dw o m a nj get married in
a mixed equilibrium and man i is willing to remain committed, woman j chooses tj
in order to maximize her own utility taking as given ¯ ti =0 :
29Max
q,cj
cjq + θj (38)
subject to
ci + cj ≤ w
m ,( 3 9 )





∧ VM =0 ⇒ ci =
wm
4tj
.( 4 1 )
This problem generates tj =1 , ci = wm/4,a n dcj =3 wm/4.A sar e s u l t ,w eh a v e ,
ζm + VM = ζm = γwm/4 and ζw + UN = ζw + zMN.




+ θi + θj − μj ≡ zMN + θi + θj − μi . (42)
Note that zMM = zNM = zMN >z NN but in both kinds of marriage either UM =
0 or VM =0 . Thus, neither of the two outcomes deﬁned above are sustainable and
both couples will revert to Nash-Cournot deﬁned by (29) through (32).12
4.4 Equilibrium
Next, consider uniform distributions of θ and μ such that they respectively have [−a,
a] and [−b, b] as their supports of the lower and upper bounds, where. Under strictly
positive assortative mating, the numbers of men and women who are willing to marry
and commit are equal. Then, according to (19)
12From equations (28) and (32) we get














Hence, zMM + zNN >z MN + zNM and positive sorting equilibria holds.
30VM − VN + b
4b
+
(VM − VN + b)2 − (VM − VN − a + b)2
8ab
= (19.c)
UM − UN + b
4b
+
(UM − UN + b)2 − (UM − UN − a + b)2
8ab
.
Equation (19.c) simpliﬁes to VM −VN = UM −UN and, given the identical distri-
butions of θ and μ,a l o n gw i t ht h ef a c tt h a tUN = UN =7 ww/36 and VN = V N =
7wm/36, it is clear that (19.c) will hold if and only if VM − UM =7 ( wm − ww)/36.
For the numbers of men and women who wish to marry with or without commit-
ment to be equal, we need
(VM − VN + b)2 − (VM − VN − a + b)2
8ab
=




which also reduces to VM −VN = UM −UN. Equation (20.c) will also hold if and only
if VM − UM =7 ( wm − ww)/36.
Thus, if VM =( 1 7 wm−8ww)/36 and UM =( 1 0 wm−ww)/36 both (19.c) and (20.c)
are satisﬁed. With that, we get a pure sorting equilibrium in which a fraction of all
marriages involve cooperative and committed behavior and the rest of the marriages
as well as all cohabiting couples are characterized by non-cooperative Nash-Cournot
outcome outcomes. And as (19.c) indicates, the higher are the gains from marriage,
the wider is the distribution of θs, and the narrower that of μ,t h eh i g h e ri st h e
fraction of marriages in which spouses commit and behave cooperatively.
With VM =( 1 7 wm − 8ww)/36 and UM =( 1 0 wm − ww)/36, the proportion of






,( 1 7 . a )
and the fraction of all men and women (both committed and uncommitted) in the
matching market equals
a2b(5wm − 4ww − 9a +1 8 b)
1152
.( 1 8 . a )
Equations (17.a) and (18.a) then deﬁne a pure-sorting equilibrium such as the one
depicted in Figure 3.
31For heuristic purposes, now take the case in which the distributions of μ diﬀer
by gender so that for men we have [−b, b + δ], 0 <δ , and for women we still have
[−b, b], as the supports of the lower and upper bounds of μ. Under strictly positive
assortative mating, the numbers of men and women who are willing to marry and
commit are equal. Then, (19) generates
VM − VN + b
4b +2 δ
+
(VM − VN + b)2 − (VM − VN − a + b)2
8ab +4 aδ
= (19.d)
UM − UN + b
4b
+
(UM − UN + b)2 − (UM − UN − a + b)2
8ab
.
For the numbers of men and women who are on the marriage market to be equal,
we need
(VM − VN + b)2 − (VM − VN − a + b)2
8ab +4 aδ
=




For δ close to zero, the analysis above would still hold and a pure sorting equilib-
rium would continue to be sustained. With higher δ, men become more reluctant to
marry and commit. As a consequence, VM will rise and UM will fall in order to keep
(20.d) satisﬁed. However, with suﬃciently large δ, (20.d) will no longer be satisﬁed
evaluated at the upper bound of VM = zMM − UN and UM = UN. Hence, we ﬁnd
that if men’s distribution of commitment costs signiﬁcantly dominate that for women
in a ﬁrst-order stochastic sense, then there will be more women willing to commit
and marry than men but also more total women than men who would like to marry
with or without commitment. Consequently, some women who would like to be in
a committed marriage would have to marry without commitment and some other
women who would like to marry without commitment would have to cohabitate in
equilibrium.
5C o n c l u s i o n
More couples cohabitate now in industrialized countries than they did three decades
ago and the propensity to marry has shown a commensurate decline. The general con-
32sensus among economists is that cohabitation is an imperfect substitute for marriage,
typically exhibiting a lower level of commitment. Beyond that, however, existing
work on how commitment factors in marriage versus cohabitation has been relatively
scant, with no acknowledgment that spousal commitment levels could vary across
married couples too, and how the trends in marriage, cohabitation as well as spousal
commitment ought to coevolve.
If marriage and cohabitation are substitutes and the choice of marital commit-
ment could not be taken for granted, then it is important to identify the conditions
under which some couples choose to marry and act cooperatively, while others decide
to marry with a lower level of commitment or simply cohabitate, mostly refraining
from a commitment to a longer-term relationship. Such a quest requires a uniﬁed
framework according to which marriage and cohabitation as well as cooperative and
non-cooperative spousal behavior can coexist in equilibrium and individuals choose
not only their (desired) marital status but their optimal modes of behavior.
In this paper, I presented a model of marriage versus cohabitation and marital
commitment versus limited commitment in determining intra-household choices and
allocations. On that basis, I showed that some married couples are able to cooperate
and operate eﬃciently, but some married and all cohabiting couples act with limited
commitment and non-cooperatively. When spousal marital commitment costs are
gender symmetric, there is a pure-sorting equilibrium in which all partners who prefer
to act with commitment in marriage are matched with someone who has the same
preference. In such an equilibrium, the beneﬁts of marital commitment accrue to
both partners.
But when there is a mixed matching equilibrium with, say, committed husbands
in short supply, men’s marital commitment incentives will be higher because com-
mitted women compete more intensely for committed husbands. An excess supply of
men who prefer marriage not only reduces the marriage incentives of men and raises
those of women, but also the marital commitment incentives of men. In such mixed-
matching equilibria, the beneﬁts of marital commitment accrue only those men or
women who are in short supply and a shortage of men (women) who can maritally
commit makes all women (men) worse oﬀ and materially indiﬀerent between marriage
or cohabitation. Finally, we saw that, if the gains from marriage fall, then not only
would more individuals choose to cohabitate but more married couples would act
33non-cooperatively.
An essential insight which emerged from all this is that allocations and outcomes in
uncommitted partnerships could, for the most part, be unresponsive to market forces.
Nevertheless, the degree to which the institution of legal marriage manifests spousal
commitment and cooperation is driven by individual attitudes toward cohabitation,
marriage as well as spousal commitment as those are manifested in market dynamics.
346 Appendix
6.1 Proving that VM > VN and UM > UN :
• If there is a mixed equilibrium with more committed men than committed
women, we have VM = VN = V N, UN = UN,a n dUM = zMM − V N.S i n c ezMM
>z NN, UN + VN = UN + V N = zNN ⇒ UN = zNN − V N,i tf o l l o w st h a tUM
= zMM − V N >U N. Hence, VM = VN and UM >U N.
• If there is a mixed equilibrium with more committed women than committed
men, UM = UN = UN, VN = V N,a n dVM = zMM − UN.S i n c ezMM >z NN,
UN + VN = UN + V N = zNN ⇒ VN = zNN − UN, it follows that VM = zMM
− UN >V N.H e n c e ,UM = UN and VM >V N.
• If there is a pure-sorting equilibrium, then only (9) and (10) hold so that UN
+ VN = UN + V N = zNN and UM + VM = zMM. Given (2), zMM >z NN.
Moreover, stability in the matching markets, together with spousal commitment
to eﬃcient outcomes, suggests no committed spouse can be worse oﬀ materially
than he or she could be in another marriage. Thus, either VM > VN and UM >
UN,o rVM >V N and UM > UN,o rVM >V N and UM >U N ¥
6.2 Proof of Proposition 8:
• (1) If UN = V N and, ∀ θ, F(θ)= ˆ F(θ) ∧∀μ, G(μ)= ˆ G(μ), then (19) holds
with VM = UM = zMM/2 and (20) holds with VM = UM = zMM/2 and VN =
UN = zNN/2. As a result, there are equal numbers of men and women who
w a n tt om a r r yw i t hc o m m i t m e n ta sw e l la se q u a l sn u m b e r so ftotal men and
women in the marriage market. Consequently, equations (8), (9), (19) and (20)
deﬁne a pure-sorting equilibrium in which VM = UM = zMM/2 and VN = UN =
zNN/2;
• (2) If F(θ) stochastically dominates ˆ F(θ) and/or ˆ G(μ) dominates G(μ),t h e n




































Given F(θ), ˆ F(θ), ˆ G(μ) and G(μ),i f@ VM ∈ (V N, zMM/2] ∧ UM ∈ [zMM/2, zMM −
V N), then (19) cannot hold in equilibrium but (19.a) will. If (19.a) holds, then VM
= V N and UM = zMM − V N. As a result, (8), (9) and (10), together with (19.a),
fully characterize this mixed equilibrium, in which there are more men than women
who would want to marry with commitment.
• (3) If ˆ F(θ) to stochastically dominates F(θ) and/or G(μ) to dominates ˆ G(μ),




































Given F(θ), ˆ F(θ), ˆ G(μ) and G(μ),i f@ UM ∈ (UN, zMM/2] ∧ VM ∈ [zMM/2,
zMM − UN), then (19) cannot hold in equilibrium but (19.b) will. If (19.b)
holds, then UM = UN and VM = zMM − UN. As a result, (8), (9) and (10),
together with (19.b), fully characterize this equilibrium with more women than
men who would like to marry with commitment.
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